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by Jo Armstrong 
 
1 Introduction 
 
“Executive’s £270m error another fiscal black hole” 
The Scotsman, 18/02/05, on funding required for heath staff 
salary costs 
 
“free health care sums are £130 million out” 
The Scotsman, 16/02/05, on funding costs for free personal 
care 
 
 
1.1  At face value these recent press headlines are a cause 
for concern. The alleged £400 million under funding 
amounts to 1.9% of the Executive’s total discretionary 
spend and, if accurate, would indicate yet more 
pressure on Scotland’s already tight finances. However, 
the drive for efficiency savings announced in 2004 is 
testament to the Executive’s desire to free up scarce 
resources and get better value for money for every 
pound spent in the public sector. What then do we 
make of the potential for added pressures implied by 
these two headlines? 
 
1.2  First, we need to take care when interpreting headlines. 
Here the £130 million shortfall for free personal care is 
forecast to occur in the year 2022
1
. That being the 
case, it would be hard to suggest the Executive is 
facing an imminent funding problem.  Secondly, in 
isolated cases, shortfalls can be easily accommodated. 
In 2004-05 the Executive was able to re-assign £621 
million of its unspent budget so easily meeting a £400 
million gap. Indeed, over a full 3-year spending review 
period additional costs of this magnitude should be 
relatively easy to absorb. Nonetheless, if underfunding 
occurs repeatedly with a number of large initiatives, the 
robustness of the Executive’s budgets could be 
undermined. 
 
1.3  In dealing with truly isolated cases the Executive can 
make use of the end year flexibility mechanism (EYF). 
This is a mechanism which allows for the spending of 
undrawn funds at the end of each financial year on 
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priority areas and initiatives. To gain this flexibility the 
Executive simply sets aside an equivalent amount of 
funding as is being allocated to the EYF pool which can 
then be utilised in later periods by the programmes that 
“contributed” to the fund. 
 
1.4  Whilst EYF has provided the Executive with such 
flexibility to manage its budgets in the past, there are 
several reasons why this may no longer be possible or 
desirable going forward. This paper aims to show why 
flexibility is likely to diminish over time and why there 
may be limitations to using EYF as a long-term financial 
management tool. In light of this, the paper also 
outlines a series of possible developments to budgeting 
and longer term financial planning which would aid the 
Executive’s financial flexibility and transparency. 
 
2 Challenges in managing the budgets 
2.1  Why then is the Executive likely to face a reduction in 
the value of EYF as a financial management tool and 
where should enhancements be made to the 
Executive’s financial management systems? To help 
answer this question it is important to assess a number 
of key challenges facing the Executive. 
 
Forecasting 
2.2  Forecasting spending commitments across the whole of 
the Executive’s budget is neither straightforward nor 
uniform. For example, there will be cases where 
accurate information on the cost of delivering a specific 
programme is difficult to acquire, such as where new 
technology or processes are being implemented for the 
first time. 
On the other hand, where the intent is to implement a 
proposal that is either an extension of an existing one 
or where something similar has been implemented in 
another jurisdiction, it is hard to see why poor cost 
estimates would be the result. 
 
2.3  Any budgeting or forecasting approach must distinguish 
between those projects for which there is little or no firm 
data on the cost of their provision and those where 
there is a far higher degree of certainty. Whilst using 
EYF funds to fill a gap is possible under either scenario, 
filling the gap is only part of the solution. If what is 
happening is the effects of two errors in forecasting 
cancelling each other out then, prudent financial 
management would require a detailed analysis of why 
gaps arose. In addition a detailed contingency plan 
outlining how it may be possible to minimise the 
chances of them recurring in the future would also be 
sensible. 
 
Wider effects from using EYF 
2.4  In addition to problems with forecasting, there are three 
other wider issues associated with EYF which merit 
discussion, namely, 
 
Æ    the opportunity cost of using EYF funds; 
Æ    future levels of EYF flexibility; 
Æ  the on-going contributions from Scottish Water. 
 
 
Table 1: EYF Comparison 2001-02 to 2003-04 
 
 
 
 
Scottish Executive portfolios 
(a) Provision for future spend 
 
 
2001-02 
 
141 
 
 
2002-03 
 
28 
 
 
2003-04 
 
119 
(b) Slippage in committed capital projects 141 101 114 
(c) Fluctuations in demand led expenditures 121 33 7 
(d) “Other Variances” 57 170 163 
Windfall income3 17 328 0 
TOTAL Scottish Executive Portfolios 477 660 403 
 
Arms-Length-Bodies    
Scottish Water 114 34 208 
Forestry Commission 3 2 3 
Crown Office 0 1 2 
Health Boards 49 24 7 
Food Standards Agency 0 1 0 
TOTAL Arms-Length-Bodies 166 62 220 
 
TOTAL EYF 
 
643 
 
722 
 
623 
 
Note: 2003-04 total includes a carry forward of £4 million 
Source: Scottish Executive, 2004 (a) 
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2.5  First, it is not clear that the current use of EYF takes 
into account the investment forgone as a consequence 
of using it to fund gaps. If the value of the foregone 
investment were to be included in the implicit 
investment decision then can we be sure in all 
circumstances that the net benefits arising are greater 
than would otherwise have been the case? In such 
circumstances we should be seeking to assess the 
opportunity cost of using these funds. This then leads 
to the need for a greater understanding of, and 
information on the marginal project and the associated 
cost-benefit trade-off. Again, simply filling the gap 
ignores this longer-term and more strategic issue. 
 
2.6  Secondly, it is likely that the flexibility afforded by EYF 
is going to diminish purely as a consequence of the 
Executive’s overall budget getting tighter but also due 
to a change in the way budgets will be managed in the 
future. 
 
2.7  To explain how this latter point could reduce flexibility 
requires an analysis of why funds become available for 
use under the EYF mechanism. The Executive has 4 
main categories, namely, 
 
a)   Provision for future spend - a provision set aside 
for planned spending commitments in future years 
 
b)   Slippage in committed capital projects - caused by 
such factors as inclement weather affecting a build 
programme 
 
c)   Fluctuations in demand led expenditures  - 
covering demand-led budget areas such as Regional 
Selective Assistance. 
 
d)   “Other Variances" -  this covers a wide range of 
relatively small and very disparate programmes across 
the Executive with no unifying factor.
2
 
 
2.1  As Table 1 shows, £623 million was available for EYF 
in the 2003-04 exercise, of which £403 million being 
attributable to one of the 4 Executive categories (the 
2001-02 and 2002-03 positions are shown for 
comparative purposes). 
 
2.2  In some Executive programmes there may be a need to 
set aside a provision for future spend even though 
there may be no formal contractual arrangement in 
place. These are planned future funding requirements. 
To accommodate such commitments the Executive 
introduced a revision to the EYF approach namely, the 
concept of a central unallocated provision (CUP). This 
development allows 100% carry forward of any 
undrawn but “committed” part of a department’s budget, 
thus overcoming the possibility of the department losing 
some or all of any associated underspend.
4 
With this 
change the Executive is aiming to create a greater 
degree of certainty in its spending forecasts. However, 
the corollary to this must be a lowering in flexibility as 
less “free cash” is available at the year-end for use to 
fund other priorities. In addition, this approach may lead 
to some of the category (b) items being re-classified as 
category (a) items, as the departments undertake a 
more detailed assessment of their programme delivery 
dates, further reducing the EYF flexibility. 
 
2.10 The most consistent reason for monies being allocated 
to the EYF pool is through slippage in committed capital 
projects. This accounted for 30% of the funds available 
in 2003-04, including arms-length-body contributions 
(see Table 2). Of the £186 million EYF available from 
this category, £72 million came from Scottish Water 
(39% of the total), £37 million from Transport (20%), 
£28 million from Justice (15%) and £19 million from 
Health (10%). 
 
 
Table 2: 2003-04 Total EYF and  EYF due to Capital Slippage 
 
Total EYF from 
EYF   Capital 
Slippage 
 
Justice 27 285 
Education 21 0 
Tourism, Culture & Sport 3 3 
Health 19 19 
Enterprise & Lifelong Learning 46 0 
European Funds 7 1 
Transport 58 37 
Communities 65 5 
Environment & Rural Affairs 90 13 
Finance & Central Services 49 7 
Administration 18 1 
TOTAL Scottish Executive Portfolios 403 114 
Scottish Water 205 72 
Other “arms-length-bodies”  13 N/a 
TOTAL 621 186 
 
 
 
Source: Scottish Executive 2004 (a) 
 
 
 
2.11 The Executive indicated that all 4 of the major 
contributors to this category were experiencing 
delays in implementing or completing capital 
programmes. For the full value of this funding to be 
maintained in the future, the cash amount of £186 
million would need to be adjusted to take account of 
inflation. Otherwise, the associated outputs may end 
up being lower than originally planned. Again a 
simple application of EYF ignores this important 
budgeting issue. 
 
2.12 The final reason why flexibility is likely to diminish in 
the future is due to the changes currently taking 
place in Scottish Water. Scottish Water has 
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historically been a key contributor to EYF. However, 
as it becomes more efficient at managing its large 
investment programme their contributions to EYF 
should fall so reducing the “free cash” available to 
the Executive. 
 
3 Possible options for change 
3.1 There is no ideal or perfect budgeting system and 
forecasting costs and revenues of the size and 
complexity managed by the Executive is fraught with 
difficulties. Nonetheless, there are 4 main areas 
where possible development or augmentation would 
seem both desirable and possible. These would be 
in: 
 
Æ the annual budgeting exercise; 
Æ the 3-year spending review cashflow forecasts; 
Æ the longer-term cashflow forecasts; and, 
Æ the wider use of cost benefit analysis and value for 
money audits. 
 
Annual budgets - Inputs and Outputs 
3.2 Currently, the Executive produces an annual forecast 
of expenditures and revenues in providing a budget 
for the year ahead. This forecast and subsequent 
revisions are essential to show Parliament that all 
programme commitments within the year can be met. 
However, of equal importance is a detailed statement 
of what outputs (rather than outcomes
6
) are expected 
to be procured with these expenditures. This 
development would then allow monitoring not only 
the rate of spend on a monthly, quarterly and annual 
basis but also monitoring of the progress within each 
programme in achieving stated output targets for the 
year. This combined set of information would provide 
a strong signal of where programmes are on target, 
where they may be ahead or where they appear to 
be slipping behind. It then becomes easier to make 
adjustments ahead of the year-end and enhance the 
possibility of bringing activities back on track. Waiting 
until the end of the year exposes the programmes 
and the Executive to all the associated problems of 
carrying forward spending from one financial year to 
the next. 
 
3.3 The Scottish Executive’s Annual Evaluation Report
7 
provides some of this information, with the most 
recent version reviewing the objectives and targets 
set out in the 2003-04 budget. This is a useful 
document performing the same function as a 
corporate annual report. It does not, however, 
provide details on what targets have been delivered 
on a programme by programme basis, what still has 
to be delivered and how programmes will get back on 
track by the end of the review period. The suggested 
developments proposed in this paper would perform 
the function of a corporate financial management 
information system. 
Annual Budgets - Fixed and variable commitments 
 
3.4 The Executive’s budget distinguishes between 
capital and revenue items. This is important in aiding 
understanding on, for example, how improvements 
are being made to Scotland’s infrastructure for the 
longer-term through spending on capital items. An 
additional way of presenting the data could be the 
provision of information on which costs are fixed and 
which are variable within each budget line. This 
would aid understanding on where flexibility within 
the budget actually exists. For example, budgets with 
a high labour cost component are unlikely to be 
flexible in the short term, eg, staff costs in the health 
budget. Alternatively, budgets with a larger 
proportion of one-off spend items, eg, additional 
contributions to local authority spending on roads, 
need not be continued in future years making this 
budget item variable in nature. Providing such a 
breakdown in the budgets ensures greater clarity 
about the nature and size of the short and long-term 
flexibility within the Executive’s budgets, both globally 
as well as at the departmental and programme level. 
 
3-year spending review cashflow forecasts - appropriate 
deflators 
 
3.5 The current spending review forecasts cover the 3- 
year period 2004-05 to 2007-08. These are adjusted 
over time to take account of, inter alia, changes in 
Whitehall’s spending which automatically leads to 
funds flowing to Scotland. These aggregate budgets 
are reported in both nominal terms (ie, including the 
effects of inflation) as well as in real terms, (ie, 
deflating the nominal numbers by the most 
appropriate cost/price deflator). Nominal forecasts 
set a limit on what cash will be made available for 
each department, meaning recipients have to budget 
within these cash numbers. A useful development to 
this would be forecasts at a more disaggregated level 
(ie, budget levels 2 and 3) in both real and nominal 
terms. This makes it far easier to understand where 
inflationary pressures may exist within the various 
budget commitments. However, to be fully 
meaningful the nominal forecasts would need to use 
the most appropriate inflator (or for real forecasts, the 
most appropriate deflator). For example, it may be 
more relevant to use a wage or earnings index rather 
than RPI where costs in a programme are 
predominately staff related. Not doing so potentially 
obscures the real challenges facing departments and 
those dependent on individual programmes.
8
 
 
3-year spending review cashflow forecasts - risk and 
uncertainty 
 
3.6 3-year cashflow forecasts require assumptions about 
the value of key variables. Inevitably, these will be 
subject to varying degrees of risk or uncertainty. To 
increase the confidence in such forecasts risk 
Pages 5-11 
 
assessments could be undertaken and sensitivity 
analysis carried out to identify the level of variance 
that may exist within any particular reported forecast. 
As was indicated earlier, this is vital where forecasts 
are being made for innovative or complex 
programmes and where the degree of accuracy 
around costs is low. 
 
3.7 Where this would seem a most useful development is 
in the cost estimates reported in the Financial 
Memorandum to the Parliament. These outline the 
likely forecast of costs associated with the 
implementation of totally new programmes or new 
legislative initiatives and as such accurate up-to-date 
data on the costs of implementation may be more 
limited. 
 
3.8 Sensitivity analysis could then be used to help 
identify the key factors underpinning any particular 
programme costs. These key factors could then be 
subjected both to a greater degree of pre- 
implementation scrutiny as well as to more intense 
on-going monitoring. The outcome would be greater 
clarity around the delivery costs as well as the 
probability and size of potential cost overruns. 
 
3.9 Finally, where uncertainty as distinct from risk exists, 
this needs to be fully taken account of in any 
cashflow forecast by the provision of a detailed set of 
strategies outlining how it will be accommodated 
within the budget forecasts. 
Longer-term cashflow forecasts – scenario planning 
 
3.10 Currently, budget forecasts cover only the 3-year 
spending review period. These are re-forecast every 
two years as part of the on-going spending review 
process. A possible development here could be the 
production of longer-term forecasts say, up to 10 
years. This would provide a framework for the 
Executive to model the cashflow impact of 
maintaining existing spending commitments, 
introducing new programmes and ceasing spending 
on programmes that have reached the end of their 
commitment period. 
 
3.11 This longer-term cashflow forecast can then be more 
sensibly used in conjunction with the application of 
various scenarios of the wider macro and regional 
economic environment facing Scotland, the UK and 
Europe and against which longer-term programmes 
and initiatives will need to be developed. 
3.12 With this development the Executive can then more 
readily answer such questions as: 
 
ÆWithin the longer-term forecast expenditure limits, 
which programmes can be funded and which 
cannot? 
ÆWhat is the optimal package of spending options 
and what does this mean for the timing of their 
rollout? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Estimated payments under current PPP contracts 
 
  
02-03 
actual 
(£m) 
 
05-06 
Plans 
(£m) 
 
06-07 
Plans 
(£m) 
 
07-08 
Plans 
(£m) 
 
TOTAL DEL 
07-08 
(£m) 
 
PPP in 
07-08 
as % of 
Total Budget 
 
TOTAL 
Of which: 
Justice 
 
318 
 
13 
 
407 
 
14 
 
420 
 
14 
 
431 
 
14 
 
25,964 
 
1,069 
 
1.7% 
 
1.3% 
Health & Community care 72 102 105 106 10,272 1.0% 
Transport 0 32 35 40 1,379 2.9% 
ERAD 92 118 120 123 941 13.1% 
FCSD 113 131 134 137 6,955 2.0% 
 
Source: Scottish Executive 2004 (c), Table 0.07 
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Longer-term cashflow forecasts – future spending 
commitments 
 
3.13 In addition, 10-year forecasts would allow a 
significantly greater analysis of what spending is 
already pre-committed through contracted payments. 
For example, between the period 2002-03 and the 
end of the current review period 2007-08, payments 
under the various Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
contracts will have risen 36%, from £318 million to 
£431 million (see Table 3). 
 
3.14 Although this represents only 1.7% of the Executive’s 
total Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL) in 2007- 
08, evaluating individual departmental lines shows a 
different picture. For example, whilst ERAD faces 
roughly similar increases in its PPP payments over 
the same period, up 33% from £92 million to £123 
million, at 13% this amounts to a greater proportion 
of its 2007-08 budget. 
 
3.15 Whilst interesting in itself, the short-term forecasts do 
not show the long-term impact inherent in some of 
these contractualised commitments say, for example, 
in rail projects or the various PPPs. In particular, 
many of the PPP contracts have a commercial 
clause that triggers a review of the PPP payments 
every 5 years. It would seem valuable to know what 
the effects these payment adjustments might have 
on the Executive’s as yet unknown future budget. 
 
Longer-term cashflow forecasts – linking to short-term 
forecasts 
 
3.16 Finally, when producing 10-year forecasts it is 
essential that they are derived in the same way as 
the 1-year and 3-year forecasts. Providing a level of 
consistency between the various financial forecasts 
would increase transparency and accountability by 
showing how and when short-term decisions are 
feeding through into the longer term. 
 
Cost benefit analysis and value for money audits 
 
3.17 All new major initiatives that seek funding from the 
Executive require to be put through a cost 
effectiveness analysis or a full cost benefit analysis 
(CBA). All investments with a positive net present 
value (NPV) at the test discount rate of 3.5% real
9
 
should be funded, assuming funds are available. The 
use of CBA is particularly well used across a wide 
range of investment areas such as in Transport, 
Health and Regional Selective Assistance. They can 
be applied to both capital and revenue based 
investments alike. A value for money (VFM) audit 
may differ from a full CBA in that it may exclude 
some of the wider and less quantifiable costs and 
benefits that may arise from a particular investment. 
However, VFM and CBA aim to address the same 
key issues of: 
 
ÆIs an investment worthy of the proposed public 
sector contribution? 
ÆWhich options are the best either in absolute or 
relative terms? 
 
3.18 The use of CBA or VFM could be extended in two 
ways. First, the Executive’s existing programme of 
commitments could be subjected to a detailed CBA 
or VFM analysis. This will provide evidence to justify 
continuing some programmes whilst leading to the 
cessation or restructuring of others. It would also 
allow the comparison between old and new funding 
commitments. To take such an approach forward a 
practical proposal could be to introduce a rolling 
programme of analyses where, for example, all 
currently funded initiatives are subjected to a review 
once every 5 years. Some of the Executive’s 
spending already faces a quinquennial review, most 
notably the funding channelled through non- 
departmental public bodies (NDPBs). Subjecting the 
remainder of the Executive’s spending to similar 
reviews would provide a level playing field and 
ensure historically funded programmes remain 
justified and value for money. 
 
3.19 Secondly, the Executive could also be aiming to learn 
about what outputs and outcomes have been 
achieved from the investment and spending already 
undertaken. This could be done through the 
implementation of a rolling programme of evaluations 
or value for money audits which could then provide 
valuable feedback into the decision-making process 
for future investments. The Executive already 
undertakes a number of VFMs audits, and this 
approach is more widely applied in local government. 
However, a wider application across the whole of the 
Executive’s activities along with a full dissemination 
of the results would be extremely valuable. With this 
information it would be possible to enhance the 
debate around what has worked and why and where 
programmes could be both continued or enhanced. 
 
4 Conclusions 
4.1 This paper proposes a number of enhancements to 
the Executive’s financial management systems 
covering both short and longer-term budgeting and 
planning. The main rationale for such enhancements 
arises from the need for more sophisticated financial 
management as budgets get tighter and the 
expectation that the flexibilities currently available to 
the Scottish Executive will diminish over time. 
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that these 
developments are aimed at complementing what is 
already underway within the Executive following the 
proposals advanced by, for example, the Financial 
Issues Advisory Group (FIAG) and the Parliament’s 
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own Finance Committee such as their proposals for 
a long term financial planning model. 
 
4.2 To develop the proposed enhancements the 
Executive will need to rely in many cases on third 
parties for basic information. This could jeopardise 
its ability to deliver. For example, local authorities, 
NHS Trusts and the many other NDPBs hold the 
data on the cost of delivery as well as what they 
procured 
and delivered with their Executive receipts. It would 
seem essential that the Executive indicates what 
information on inputs and outputs it wishes to 
receive by budget line, providing the basis of a 
common data set across all its many budget 
recipients. 
 
4.3 Notwithstanding this data difficulty, the proposals 
for budgeting and planning outlined above rely on 
techniques that are well used in both the public and 
private sector. Whilst there will be no one 
organisation which has the template the Executive 
might wish to adopt, learning the lessons by 
collaboration would greatly speed up the process of 
effective implementation. 
 
4.4 Finally, having good data and knowing what needs 
to be done is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
to secure the required changes in financial 
management. Just as important is having people in 
the central finance function with the requisite skills 
and authority to perform the scrutiny and co- 
ordination function. Whilst the Executive aims to 
make this finance group stronger, the individual 
departments may wish less central scrutiny as they 
would argue they are ultimately accountable for the 
management and allocation of their own budgets. 
However, for the proposed developments to be 
implemented in a timely and consistent manner 
across the whole of the Executive’s portfolio a 
strong central finance function is essential, even 
more since the HM Treasury scrutiny role has all but 
disappeared. 
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Endnotes 
1 Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2005 
2 Examples of such programmes include (a) delays in 
funding being released in ELLD’s Enterprise in Education 
Determined to Succeed Fund of £4 million; carry forward 
in Renewable Energy due to a delay in the Corpach CHP 
project of £3 million. 
3 Windfall income comprises one-off benefits of (a) HM 
Treasury agreeing to fund debt breakage costs associated 
with the Glasgow housing stock transfer and, (b) the 
release of a provision to cover possible cost of appeals 
following the revaluation of non-domestic rates. 
4 A measure to incentivise departments to manage 
their budgets more effectively. 
5 The £27 million total EYF for Justice is the sum of £28 
from “capital slippage”, -£9 million from “fluctuations in 
demand led expenditures” and £8 million from “other 
smaller initiatives”. 
6 In many instances it is not sensible to indicate annually 
whether anticipated final outcomes have been delivered. 
Nonetheless, expenditure on outputs should be linked to 
the achievement of longer-term final outcomes and these 
should then be verified over time through the application 
of structured monitoring and evaluation techniques. 
7 The Scottish Executive, 2004(b) 
8 The provision of this data does not necessarily mean a 
higher level of funding being automatically allocated to 
any programme should the appropriate index be higher 
than forecast RPI. Budgets could still be set with an RPI-
related growth factor should there be a wish, for example, 
to encourage the delivery of efficiency savings. 
9 Based on HMT’s The Green Book. 
 
